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ADVANCING THE SUPRANATIONAL COMPLIANCE DEBATE – NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW
Henri de Waele*
Abstract: For a successful effectuation of the supranational rights of EU citizens and third country nationals,
it is crucially important that the rules and principles flowing from the European Treaties and the associated
legislation are ensured in full. The available methods of public enforcement (in particular the monitoring
powers of the European Commission) are however insufficient to achieve that goal: compliance with the rel-
evant EU rules and norms also depends to a considerable extent on the policy dynamics, public infrastructure
and (styles of) administrative governance of the country concerned. This paper makes a modest attempt to
fill a gap that is believed to lie between, on the one hand, leading political science theories on the reception
of EU law in the Member States, and on the other, the main legal studies on the quality of legislation and the
(in)adequacy of the existing procedural frameworks for effectuating citizens’ rights. The main objective is to
explore some possible alternative avenues for facilitating the interplay between the EU and the national legal
orders. By providing illustrations of some existing bottlenecks, asymmetric centrifugal/centripetal forces and
avoidable feedback-loops, it points out how current practices may be enhanced, and outlines possible new
directions for securing a more structural domestic compliance record. 
Keywords: compliance, European Union Law, citizens’ rights, enforcement procedure, soft law, private 
enforcement, regulatory fitness checks, quality of legislation
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Citizens’ Rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Ever since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), the realisation of an
‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) has been one of the many objectives of the
European Union. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the EU is actually
proclaimed to be such an area.1 However, it appears to be still insufficiently realised nowa-
days that since 2009, this ambition is no longer restricted to a particular field or sub-do-
main of EU law, but that the proclamation rather extends to the entire framework, thus
encompassing the European would-be polity in its totality.2
The threefold objectives that have been identified, freedom, security and justice, cover
various different topics and dossiers. In this paper, for a moment we shall consciously
sidestep the traditional, more specific legal content of the AFSJ project that is already
amply debated elsewhere.3 Taken in its modern broader sense, the notion of ‘freedom’ can
be said to pertain to the free movement of persons across the board, ‘security’ to the safe-
guarding of those persons’ rights and shielding them from harm, and ‘justice’ to ideas of
inclusion, equal treatment, and the placing at their disposal of effective judicial remedies.
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1 Article 67(1) TFEU.
2 Hence its novel inclusion among the Union’s main objectives, listed in Article 3(2) TEU.
3 See e.g., with further references, Cian Murhpy, Diego Acosta Arcorazo (eds.). The Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice after Lisbon and Stockholm. Oxford: Hart Publishing 2013.
Hereby, various types of rights from various different sources accrue to EU citizens, with
the ground rules originating from so-called ‘primary law’ (the founding treaties and at-
tached protocols4), and more detailed provisions being contained in ‘secondary law’
(mostly regulations, directives and decisions). Notwithstanding the fact that it officially
does not form part of either primary or secondary law, the newly binding Charter of Fun-
damental Rights, somewhat clumsily tucked away in the Union’s Official Journal, occupies
a prominent place, by virtue of a cross-reference in the EU Treaty.5
As a second preliminary point, it should be duly noted that Member State nationals are
not the sole beneficiaries of the rights contained in these documents, but that some of
these extend to persons with the nationality of a third country (TCNs) as well. Further-
more, though not officially legally binding, due tribute should be paid to the ever-greater
importance of soft law, be it in the form of guidelines, notices, recommendations, state-
ments, resolutions, opinions or action plans.6
1.2 Compliance: A Crucial Concept
It is, of course, an excruciatingly bland truism to state that rules remain wholly ineffective
if they are not being complied with. Likewise, the modern AFSJ concept would ultimately
falter if, e.g., due to legal- administrative obstacles, migration from one country to another
turns out to be highly cumbersome or nigh impossible. Similarly, if the established com-
mon frameworks in e.g. the field of criminal law are (accidently or intentionally) ignored
or disrespected, this inevitably puts the security of native and non-native inhabitants at
risk. Likewise, citizens traversing the Union are treated to a cold and nasty shower in case
the basic laws demanding their equal treatment are being patently disrespected in reality.
Clearly then, in spite of the lofty trumpeting of freedom, security and justice, the EU may
ultimately only constitute a genuine AFSJ if the words on paper are actually being lived up
to. Public authorities carry a special responsibility here, as they are bound to implement
and enforce the relevant norms faithfully, timely, structurally and in their entirety.
Compliance has been a central topic of research in legal and governance studies for
several decades already. In the abstract, the term denotes a state of conformity or identity
between an actor’s behaviour and a specified rule.7 The compliance perspective thus starts
from a given norm and asks whether the addressees thereof actually conform to it.8
For the EU as such, ensuring Member State compliance continues to pose a major chal-
lenge. In the peculiar, hybrid constitutional settlement, the application of Union law is
mostly placed in the hands of the Member States’ authorities. This renders the compliance
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4 Most importantly, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty concerning the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU).
5 Article 6(1) TEU.
6 The enumeration is not exhaustive. For a comprehensive analysis, see SENDEN, L. Soft Law in European Com-
munity Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing 2004.
7 RAUSTIALA, K. SLAUGHTER, A. M. International Law, International Relations, and Compliance. In: Walther Carl-
naes, Thomas Risse, Beth Simmons (eds.). The Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage Publishers
2001, p. 539.
8 TREIB, O. Implementing and Complying with EU Governance Outputs. 3 Living Reviews in European Governance,
lreg-2008-5 (available at: <http://europeangovernance.livingreviews.org/Articles/lreg-2008-5>, last visited 
10 December 2013), p. 4.
issue even more complex, as those who have created the pertinent rules are often different
from those who are expected to execute and abide by those rules. Obviously then, a struc-
tural, correct and uniform application requires some real dedication from national public
administrations, courts and potential litigators. It can however be considerably stymied
or facilitated by parameters inherent to the particular political system or culture. Non-
compliance can thus occur all too easily, and takes various forms. Krislov, Ehlermann and
Weiler have identified numerous different manifestations, among which: lack of imple-
mentation, lack of application, lack of enforcement, incorrect implementation, applica-
tion or enforcement, pre- and post-litigation non-compliance, defiance, and evasion.9
Unfortunately, there has yet to emerge a methodological consensus on how compliance
can best be measured. Some prefer a qualitative approach, focusing on a small number
of directives in a single policy field and studying compliance in a select number of Member
States. Others engage in quantitative studies, comparing compliance across countries and
policy sectors. The involvement of both too many and too few EU legal instruments ham-
pers the possibility to draw general conclusions – yet, it is unclear what number of instru-
ments would be ‘about right’ to focus on. In all likelihood, cross-sectoral studies are more
helpful than single-sector ones, but each sector is characterised by its own idiosyncrasies,
and it remains tricky to pick out those sectors that are truly suitable to be compared. Con-
sequently, the theories on compliance developed so far have turned out to be ‘sometimes
true theories’ at most, valid for some countries, but certainly not for all.10 However, the
empirical results do convincingly show that, while there are huge inter-country disparities,
strong similarities exist nonetheless among (members of) different groups of countries.
Overall, Falkner and Treib have distinguished four ‘world of compliance’: the world of law
observance (predominated by a culture of respect for the rule of law), the world of neglect
(where such a culture is absent), the world of domestic politics (where political preferences
of government parties and other powerful players determine compliance) and the world
of dead letters (where obligations are met on paper, but not put into actual practice).11
Overall then, in this field of research, the certainties are few and far between. For the
time being, the size of the compliance deficit and the correct methodology with which it
could be assessed belong to the category of the unknowns. The knowns are, firstly, that
there definitely does exist a deficit, and secondly, that several patterns of compliance per-
sist among the Member States. Since every legal system is familiar with the gap between
the law in the books and the law in action, there is no greater cause for concern here than
elsewhere; long delays and attempts at shirking the rules are a matter of everyday
business.12 As Francis Snyder asserted, it would be rather more remarkable if, in this re-
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States and the European Community. In: Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe, Joseph Weiler (eds.). Integration
Through Law, Methods, Tools and Institutions: Political Organs, Integration Techniques and Judicial Process.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1986, p. 61 ff.
10 FALKNER, G., HARTLAPP, M., TREIB, O. Worlds of Compliance: Why Leading Approaches to the Implementation
of EU Legislation are only Sometimes-True Theories’. European Journal of Political Research. 2007, No. 46, 
pp. 395–416.
11 FALKNER, G., TREIB, O. Three Worlds of Compliance or Four? The EU-15 compared to New Member States. Jour-
nal of Common Market Studies. 2008, No. 46, pp. 293–313.
12 TREIB, O. supra n. 8, at p. 5.
spect, the EU would be any different from other systems.13 This is however not to say that
no efforts should be made to minimise the discrepancy and tackle those obstacles that
are capable of being overcome. 
While top-down enforcement, i.e. action undertaken by the European Commission
against defaulting Member States, serves as one of the main vehicles for ensuring com-
pliance, as will be highlighted in the next section of this paper, this approach is ham-
pered by a plethora of defects. Also, in the near future, its importance and overall effec-
tiveness is likely to decline further, as the EU is at some point foreseen to encompass
over thirty Member States. Moreover, the effectiveness of top-down sanctions ought to
be questioned in abstracto, since political entities are incomparable to human beings,
and therewith less likely prone to alter their behaviour in response to punishment. Fi-
nally, since compliance with rules and norms originating from outside a legal system
depends to a considerable extent on the policy dynamics, public infrastructure and
(style of) administrative governance of the respective country, more constructive tactics
might be devised that tease out the desired outcomes with greater speed and success.
All this is thought to warrant a meticulous analysis of the alternative strategies that could
be pursued, and an extensive gauging of their added value. To be sure, some of these are
already being pursued; others are relatively new and more original. What all have in
common is that they are worthy of more detailed reflection, as the tried-and-tested ap-
proaches could be polished further, and serious consideration given to those alternatives
that are not yet (fully) deployed.
To be sure, while increased compliance is essential to make the grand ambition of turn-
ing the entire EU into an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, there are sundry other is-
sues that need to be addressed in order to arrive at that destination. But one bone of con-
tention might be the concept of ‘procedural autonomy’, which allows Member States quite
considerable room for maintaining unhelpful legal peculiarities in their organisation of
their judiciary and in the system of available remedies.14 Consequently, in the absence of
European harmonisation, those attempting to effectuate their rights in the AFSJ may be
surprised to find that the chances of success for their identical claims and lawsuits may
still vary greatly from one country to another. By consequence, if litigants experience dif-
ficulties from such divergences in the effectuation of their rights, non-compliant Member
States more easily get away with being negligent. Novel initiatives to counteract this situ-
ation are therefore to be welcomed, yet what is required may be little short of a paradigm
shift. Unfortunately, neither the launch of the AFSJ, nor the wholesale reform of the EU
legal system resulting from the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon, have so far produced
an all-pervasive sense of urgency.15
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Modern Law Review. 1993, No. 56, p. 26.
14 For a more complete discussion, see JANS, J., DE LANGE, R., PRECHAL, S., WIDDERSHOVEN, R. Europeanisation
of Public Law. Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2007, pp. 40–59.
15 For earlier calls for reconsideration and proposals for procedural harmonisation, see e.g. HIMSWORTH, CH.
Things Fall Apart: The Harmonisation of Community Judicial Protection Revisited. European Law Journal. 1997,
No. 22, pp. 291–311; STORME, M. (ed.). Rapprochement du droit judiciare de l’Union européenne – Approximation
of Judiciary Law in the European Union. Antwerp: Kluwer 1994.
1.3 The Aims and Structure of this Paper
The objectives of this paper are twofold. In the next section, we will commence by draw-
ing up a concise sketch of the central pathway for enforcing European Union law, the ‘in-
fringement procedure’, which represents the primary legal tool to ensure Member State
compliance (paragraph 2.1).16 Separate attention will be devoted to a recent adjustment
to its modus operandi (paragraph 2.2). Immediately hereafter, we will take a look at the
proliferous downsides and shortcomings of this approach, which have, after all the expe-
riences accumulated in the past decades, become increasingly evident (paragraph 2.3). 
The second objective of this paper is to explore the alternatives routes for ensuring com-
pliance in considerable detail, review their merits, and assess how they might be deployed
to greater effect. After a short introduction (paragraph 3.1), we will in subsequent order be
taking a look at the feasibility of improvements to the quality of EU legislation (paragraph
3.2), increased guidance for national public authorities through soft law measures (paragraph
3.3), encouraging domestic actors to engage more actively in private enforcement (paragraph
3.4), the creation of novel incentive schemes or facilitating mechanisms at the EU level (para-
graph 3.5), and improved monitoring and control at Member State level, optionally with the
aid of special regulatory frameworks (paragraph 3.6). The idea is to identify in the process
some factors that may currently inhibit a more complete adherence to the demands of EU
law, produce administrative bottlenecks or avoidable feedback-loops, and may simultane-
ously render the central means of redress (top-down enforcement) less effective. As remarked
above, some of the options highlighted in this section are at present already being pursued,
yet may need to be given a second thought, or put up for a thorough recalibration fairly soon. 
At this point, it should be stressed that this paper by no means intends to offer an ex-
haustive survey of all possible alternatives.17 Rather, the aforementioned avenues have
been selected on the basis of the fact that they appear to have received insufficient atten-
tion in academic studies so far, and in the belief that the viability of some of these has, up
until now, not yet been explored sufficiently. In the final section (paragraph 4), we therefore
conclude by highlighting how these alternatives map onto the current legal architecture,
and which steps would need to be undertaken in order to further advance the Member
States’ compliancy potential. 
2. TOP-DOWN ENFORCEMENT: THE INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURE 
AND ITS FAILINGS
2.1 Set-Up and Workings
The infringement procedure, nowadays premised on Articles 258 and 260 TFEU, has
been a cornerstone of the EU legal system since the inception of the integration process
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Member States, and for transgressions of the ‘Stability Pact’ (i.e. the rules governing the Economic and Monetary
Union), but in what follows, these other regimes will only be incidentally brought to the fore.
17 In particular, it consciously evades the recent discussions on a possible recalibration of the means to deal with
structural infringements of the Union’s values, listed in Article 2 TEU. On that issue, see further e.g. DAWSON, M.,
MUIR, E. Enforcing Fundamental Values: EU Law and Governance in Hungary and Romania. Maastricht Journal
of European and Comparative Law. 2012, pp. 469–476.
in the early 1950s. Over time, it has easily eclipsed its sibling procedure, located in Article
259 TFEU, basically an instrument for Member States to take on one another. Over sixty
years of practice have resulted in no more than a handful of cases, and on fairly marginal
issues at that; regrettable as the situation may be, on this ground alone, we may confi-
dently leave it aside. 
Conceptually, the infringement procedure is predicated on a classic separation des pou-
voirs theorem; though the European Commission is placed squarely in the hot-seat, the
power to sanction Member States for infringements has been reserved for the judiciary,
the European Court of Justice (ECJ).18 In its role as ‘guardian of EU law’, the Commission
is to investigate possible transgressions of any type or gravity, and it does so either of its
own motion, on the basis of a complaint from individuals, or following information sub-
mitted by Member States or Members of the European Parliament. Since the Commission
bears the cost of litigation and is capable of acting for those who do not have the resources
or standing to take legal action themselves, at least in theory, the procedure is rather egal-
itarian.19
The procedure consists firstly of an administrative stage: the sending of a letter of formal
notice, and if this yields no results, a reasoned opinion to the country concerned; both
specify and corroborate the perceived malpractice, and will demand that it be rectified.20
If the matter is not satisfactorily resolved at the administrative stage, the Commission may
subsequently initiate proceedings before the ECJ.21 Member States only risk to be sanc-
tioned financially (in the form of a lump sum and/or periodic penalty payment – a novelty
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993) when they refuse to abide by an ECJ judgment
condemning their position, do not bow to the demands of the Commission in a novel
letter of formal notice, and are then taken to Court for a second time.22 Understandably,
this eats up a considerable amount of time, but in reality, cases are only rarely pushed that
far, with issues most often being settled at a much earlier point in time.23
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18 The term ‘ECJ’ can be used for either the official institution, encompassing the Court of Justice, the General
Court and the Civil Service Tribunal, or in a more narrow sense, only referring to its ‘first limb’ (the Court of Jus-
tice). In accordance with Articles 256 and 258–260 TFEU, it is only the ECJ in this narrow sense that deals with
infringement cases.
19 CHALMERS, D., DAVIES, G., MONTI, G. European Union Law: Text and Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2010, p. 319. 
20 The administrative stage is ordinarily preceded by informal contacts between Commission and Member States
officials, attempting to resolve the matter or clear up possible misunderstandings, so that further official steps
become unnecessary.
21 It should be noted that under the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951; expired in
2002), the High Authority (the precursor to the European Commission) was itself empowered to pursue infringe-
ments and impose sanctions on Member States. The current procedure does not follow this template, but is
based on the model set up under the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957) and the
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (1957).
22 See Article 260 TFEU. Exceptionally however, in accordance with Article 260 (3) TFEU, when the Commission
brings a case before the ECJ on the grounds that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligation to notify meas-
ures transposing a directive adopted under a legislative procedure, it may immediately request for the imposition
of a lump sum or penalty payment. The Court may then proceed to impose a financial penalty not exceeding
the amount specified by the Commission (while ordinarily, the ECJ enjoys discretion in this regard).
23 For example, at the end of 2009, almost 90 % of all investigated cases were closed during the informal and
administrative stage; see the 27th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU law, COM(2010) 538
final, p. 3.
2.2 The New Fast-Track Scheme
In 2007, the Commission introduced an experimental modification in its case-handling.
The overriding ambition was to improve the communication and cooperation between
the Commission and Member State authorities on issues concerning the application of
EU law, providing quicker and fuller answers to questions, and solutions to problems aris-
ing in the application of EU law that require confirmation of the factual or legal position.24
The key idea of the new ‘fast-track scheme’ has been to make a distinction between dif-
ferent types of cases, as certain of these (own initiative inquiries) would deserve to be
given extra priority, whereas certain others (those based on complaints from third parties)
were perfectly suited to be resolved in ‘triangular traffic’ between the Commission, the
complainant and the Member State indicted. In the latter cases, the issue raised is initially
still examined by the responsible service in the Commission. Thereafter, the matter will
be forwarded to the Member State authority concerned, accompanied by any questions
or indications identified by that service. 25 Unless urgency requires immediate action or
when the Commission considers that contact with the Member State can contribute to an
efficient solution, a short deadline is given to provide the necessary clarifications, infor-
mation and solutions directly to the citizens or businesses concerned, and inform the
Commission thereof. The ordinary response-deadline has been set at ten weeks.26 When
the issue amounts to a breach of EU law, Member States are expected to remedy, or offer
a remedy, within fixed timetables. When no solution is proposed, the Commission is to
provide a follow-up and take further action, notably by firing up the infringement proce-
dure in the regular manner. Since April 2008, the scheme has been gradually expanded,
and it currently operates smoothly in twenty-five of the current twenty-eight Member
States (with Luxembourg, Malta and Croatia somewhat belatedly joining the pack). 
2.3 Downsides and Shortcomings
In fifty-odd years, the infringement procedure has become a well-known quantity, serv-
ing as a linchpin for a rich and colourful series of judgments, and for that reason alone,
some lawyers may hold it in high esteem. At the same time, its long pedigree should not
tempt one to turn a blind eye to its defects, since over the course of time, multiple reasons
have cropped up for questioning its style of operation, as well as its overall efficacy.27
2.3.1 Informational Deficit
A first troublesome aspect relates to the fact that the Commission is unable to register
each and every violation of EU law, for lack of the necessary investigative resources. As re-
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25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 See also, inter alia, HARLOW, C., RAWLINGS, R. Accountability and Law Enforcement: The Centralised EU In-
fringement Procedure. European Law Review. 2006, No. 31, pp. 447–475; SMITH, M. Enforcement, Monitoring,
Verification, Outsourcing: The Decline and Decline of the Infringement Procedure. European Law Review. 2008,
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marked, it derives its information mainly from individual complaints, tip-offs from other
Member States or MEPs.28 There are only limited ways in which it can gain comprehensive
knowledge of deviant rules and practices at the national level, or procure additional in-
criminating evidence if it does not yet dispose of more than hazy indications, since most
countries strive to keep their internal policy dynamics covered under the traditional cloak
of national sovereign prerogative. Nowadays, there do exist various offices, bodies and
agencies that can supply and channel helpful information; but one example is the Euro-
pean Environment Agency (est. 1993). Nonetheless, Member States are not anxious to
endow such entities with any general powers of inspection so that they might roam freely
and undertake on-the-spot investigations. It is equally unlikely that the Commission itself
would one day be attributed a competence such as the one it possesses in competition
law, viz. to trace unlawful conduct of undertakings, in any other domain of European law,
so that it could counteract any normative divergences or transgressions caused or com-
mitted by national public authorities. 
As could be predicted, the upshot of the absence of a more developed armamentarium
is a funnelling-effect, whereby dossiers end up on the desks in Brussels on a fairly random
basis. Moreover, in specialised areas of law, the influx of cases and complaints is depend-
ent on the vigilance of the stakeholders concerned. Moreover, little can be expected of the
public officials active in that domain that are employed by bungling Member States them-
selves. However, it should be added that the foregoing does not hold true for one particular
type of infringements, namely the non-transposition of directives; for by virtue of a refined
digital repository, the so-called MNE database, the Commission is able to pursue deficien-
cies in this regard in a structured and symmetrical manner.29 Yet, even when there exists
no deficit of information here, a related bottleneck (to which we will return below) con-
tinues to make itself felt, namely the lack of operational resources to go after every case of
non-transposition.
2.3.2 Longevity of Procedures
A substantial and unmistakable downside of the infringement procedure resides in the
temporal dimension. For if a Member State steadfastly refuses to change course, acquiesce
to the Commission’s demands and abandon its illicit rules or practices, it may be necessary
to walk through all the administrative and judicial stages, ultimately resulting in a Court
judgment imposing a lump sum or penalty payment. This takes up a protracted period of
time. For example, in the Spanish bathing water dossier, the first inquiry was initiated in
1988, with the administrative stage opening up in 1989, Court proceedings being initiated
in 1996, Spain being condemned in 1998, a second procedure commencing that same
year, a second referral to the judiciary taking place in 2001, and financial sanctions being
imposed in 2003.30 In the 1999–2003 period, the average time taken to process infringe-
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28 As known, for political reasons, Member States have rarely been willing to initiate proceedings against one of
their equals on the basis of Article 259 TFEU, preferring to relay the details of the offense to the Commission.
29 ‘MNE’ stands for ‘mesures nationales d’exécution des directives’. Upon completing their implementation
process, all Member States are bound to feed a transcript of their transposition measures into this database. It
thereby requests them to indicate whether they transposed the contents of the directive in full (if there existed
no prior national law on the topics concerned) or in part (always allowed in case of ‘optional’ harmonisation).
ments, from opening the file to sending the application to the ECJ, took twenty-seven
months. Somewhat peculiarly, this figure has recently been contrasted with the average
duration in the 1999–2008 so as to underline the progress that has been made.31 Yet, even
if this skewered presentation is considered to make sense, the total decrease amounts to
scarcely three months, and even then, it should be kept in mind that the number only per-
tains to the first round of the struggle, with a possible (additional time consuming) fol-
low-up being necessary to make penalisation possible.32
Of course, it must not be overlooked that in reality, many disputes are resolved in one
of the earlier phases of the dispute, so that it is rarely necessary for proceedings to span
the entire gamut. At the same time, for those situations where (either in good or in bad
faith) a country decides to drag its heels, or entirely put its foot in, a maximum of time will
have to be invested in order to make it see the error of its ways, and put the matter beyond
dispute.33 Far from providing relief, the new fast-track scheme, outlined above, actually
appears counterproductive, for if a Member State does not satisfactory deal with a com-
plaint during a more protracted first phase (comprising some two to three months), the
infringement procedure will still have to be deployed. In those cases, the earlier period of
time has basically been wasted.34 The consequence of all this longevity is that com-
plainants may give up pursuing the alleged infraction at some point, or even decide
against lodging a complaint altogether; for all too often, justice delayed remains justice
denied. The excessive duration of the infringement procedure is equally awkward from
a more general perspective, since it means that even in cases of serious violations of EU
law, the detrimental effects can keep spreading for years.
2.3.3 Unpropitious Commission Discretion
Although the literal wording of the key provisions may appear to oblige the Commission
to undertake action against each and every infringement of European norms and princi-
ples, in reality, it enjoys a discretionary power to initiate proceedings. Thus, whenever
there are compelling reasons for keeping its eyes shut or regarding a transgression as in-
significant, nothing prevents it from letting the malefactor walk free. Even in an ongoing
procedure, it remains entirely at liberty to close the file and let the incriminated Member
State off the hook, without disclosing the reasons for its decision.35
The reasons for taking a discretionary approach in the exercise of its competence are
well-known: the Commission simply does not dispose of the resources to pursue every
single violation of EU law, and therefore it should remain unfettered to pick, choose, ignore
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30 See Case C-92/96, Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-505, and Case C-278/01, Commission v Spain, [2003] ECR
I-14141.
31 27th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU law, COM(2010) 538 final, p. 2.
32 Unless the case revolves around the non-transposition of a legislative directive; cf. supra, fn. 22. However, if
a Member State has duly notified its measures transposing such a directive, yet the latter are defective or in-
complete, Art. 260(3) TFEU cannot be applied, and follow-up action has to be based on Art. 260(1) TFEU.
33 The Commission emerges victoriously in more than 90 % percent of the cases that end up on the Courts’ docket;
see CHALMERS, D. Judicial Authority and the Constitutional Treaty. International Journal of Constitutional Law.
2005, No. 4, pp. 452–453.
34 SMITH, M. supra n. 27, p. 798.
35 The ECJ has so far made no bones about this; see e.g. Case 247/87, Star Fruit v Commission, [1989] ECR 291.
and prioritise. The fact that not all transgressors will be hunted down is similarly agreeable
for the Union’s already gravely encumbered judiciary. Moreover, an obvious analogy can
be drawn with national public prosecutors, who are often explicitly instructed to focus on
those offenses that cannot possibly be condoned; even if they are bound to pursue every
transgression, practical constraints will render it impossible to live up to that ideal.36
However understandable the discretionary approach may be, the resulting problems
do not become any less poignant. To begin with, it leads to a situation of inequality, since
some Member States may be reprimanded for trespasses that others are tacitly allowed to
commit; even if the offense can be regarded as a minor one, it is up to the Commission to
decide (or feign) that there is a compelling reason to press ahead. Consequently, the
choices made cannot help but suffer from a certain arbitrariness, which lies at odds with
the demands of the rule of law and the idea of legal certainty. To point out but one exam-
ple, reference may be made to the pernicious reticence displayed in the early 2000s, with
regard to violations of the Stability and Growth Pact by some of the larger Member States. 
In the same vein, it is hard to digest that the underlying motives for (not) pursuing a case
can remain completely covered in secrecy; in fact, all documents relating to the investiga-
tive procedure, including the reasoned opinion, are kept confidential – a remarkable feat,
as transparency is otherwise considered to be one of the general principles of EU law.37 In
addition, contrary to the assertion made earlier, the egalitarian character of the infringe-
ment procedure seems largely cosmetic, as not every plaintiff can be certain that its case
will actually be pursued. Among the detrimental ramifications we can therefore also count
the dashing of the hopes raised among complainants, and the collateral damage caused
to the popular perception of the European Union and its institutions. 
Overall then, the Commission’s discretion gives rise to yet another unhelpful funnel-
effect, whereby norms and practices are left unaddressed despite their being irrefutably
deviant. Among the casualties are legal certainty, equality and transparency, and the clash
with central tenets of good governance and sound administration are readily evident as
well. Nevertheless, it is a characteristic of the infringement procedure that is unlikely to
be overcome; even if it were pressured to steer a different course or one day spontaneously
change tack, it would be unable to raise its performance, as it could not possibly be
granted unlimited means. 
2.3.4 Misguided Reliance on Negative Stimuli
Another major downside is a more ideological one that we have already touched upon
above. As insights gathered from modern psychological research underscore, punishment,
or the mere threat thereof, forms in itself a far from ideal trigger to stimulate behavioural
altercations. Instead, intrinsically positive tactics are preferable to attain the desired out-
come, and frequently even succeed to deliver the goods within a shorter span of time. Put
differently, the donning of velvet gloves may often yield more productive results than lash-
ing out with the iron fist. In the same vein, one may criticise the infringement procedure
for being too much stick and too little carrot, whereas the two could work to better effect
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when combined. Yet, in utilising either velvet gloves, iron fists, stick- or carrot-tactics, it
should be recognised that what works for individuals cannot so carelessly be transposed
to a legal context wherein the overriding aim is to spark a regulatory change or executive
action in a public administration. 
Overall then, it is far too simplistic to assume that Member States can be goaded in
a certain direction for fear of incurring a financial penalty, for ‘deterrence’ simply does not
operate in the same way for legal contraptions as it does for human beings.38 Of course, it
is true that the infringement procedure is not predominantly concerned with sanctioning,
and that it primarily operates as a conduit for resolving conflicts and preventing unnec-
essary escalations. Moreover, it displays sufficient flexibility to allow for problems to be
resolved on the basis of dialogue, reasoning and mutual understanding. All the same, this
does not take the sting out of our qualms entirely: for in itself, dishing out punishment re-
mains an overly negative strategy, and it is especially misguided to assume financial sanc-
tions are most efficacious.39
To add insult to injury, the effects of such sanctions, even the mere threat of their im-
position, vary greatly depending on the size, political and economic power of the country
concerned. As a result, it may be considered exceedingly naïve to expect Commission ac-
tion to exert an equal compliance pull on all Member States – with the protracted reticence
displayed with regard to violations of the Stability and Growth Pact by some of the larger
Member States once again forming a case in point.      
2.3.5 Persistency of Paper Realities
As indicated above, political scientists researching patterns of compliance have distin-
guished several different worlds of compliance: one in which rule observance is a matter
of course, because the rule of law is taken extremely seriously; one in which this is hardly
the case, and deficiencies in adhering to supranational rules are a regular occurrence; one
in which EU requirements are generally met due to the favourable collaboration of key
players.40 A relatively new discovery has been the existence of a fourth type, in which the
legal codes are integrally attuned to the European demands in theory, but where the rel-
evant rules are not being upheld in reality.41 Unsurprisingly, the results achieved in en-
forcing EU law in a top-down manner vary in these different contexts.42 A decisive weak-
ness of this approach is its inability to ascertain the factual situation in a Member State
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pp. 395–416.
41 See FALKNER, G., HARTLAPP, M., TREIB, O., supra n. 10.
42 It should be noted that the inferences in the cited studies were actually based on statistics with regard to the in-
fringement procedure.
with complete accuracy; consequently, where countries would deserve to be chided, they
may be officially commended for attaining the set objectives instead.
Naturally, the Commission does not content itself with paper realities, and neither does
the ECJ; for example in the field of environmental law, whereas in the eyes of the Court, it
cannot principally and directly be inferred from the fact that a factual situation is not in
conformity with the objectives laid down in a rule of EU law that a Member State has failed
to fulfil its obligations, if that situation is considered to persist and, in particular, if it leads
to a significant deterioration in the environment over a prolonged period, without any ac-
tion being taken by the competent authorities, this should be taken as an indication of
a breach of the applicable legal standards.43 Moreover, misleading information may well
be fed into the MNE-database about directive provisions which are in fact improperly im-
plemented or hardly applied. This does not preclude more detailed inquiries from taking
place by the competent European authorities, but at the same time, it will be up to the lat-
ter to come up with the necessary evidence to demonstrate the presence of a discrepancy
between the norm and the reality. As outlined above, for the Commission, this remains
especially problematic, for want of proper investigative powers, pervasive monitoring
tools and technical-administrative resources. Moreover, as explained earlier, the risk of
incurring financial penalties is insufficiently dissuasive, and even wholly ineffective for
bringing about the necessary social-cultural change. 
All this is not to say that the propensity among Member States to indulge in paper prom-
ises is omnipresent, and nor is such a disposition absolutely immutable. Yet, it is unlikely
to be stamped out by assiduous and incremental deployment of the infringement proce-
dure alone. Unfortunately, the novel fast-track scheme only appears to have added insult
to injury, as in a great number of cases, it has outsourced the responsibility to deal with
complaints and complainants to the very entity accused of infringing the law.44 Unwit-
tingly, this design has diminished the chances for a more rapid resolution of the dispute
in three out of four worlds of compliance to a formidable extent, rendering the restyled
first phase of the proceedings virtually useless.
3. THE ALTERNATIVES TO TOP-DOWN ENFORCEMENT
3.1 On the Need to Look Further
When the European Communities were launched in the 1950s, the infringement pro-
cedure was the only codified instrument for keeping the Member States in check. In the
celebrated Van Gend & Loos case, the Dutch and the Belgian government famously
stressed the centrality of the infringement procedure, in an attempt to stave off any judge-
made alternatives.45 Yet, this could not prevent the Court from launching a first new rem-
edy, the principle of direct effect, entailing that citizens would be able to claim the rights
flowing from EU law in their domestic courts, irrespective of how the reception of inter-
national norms in the national legal order was regulated in the Member State concerned
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(in a ‘monist’ or ‘dualist’ fashion). The ECJ has broadened the scope for judicial enforce-
ment further, e.g. by enabling citizens to submit liability claims in national courts in case
they suffer damages, as a result of a sufficiently serious breach of EU law by the Member
State concerned.46 Over the course of time, several other innovations facilitating the ef-
fectuation of European rights within the domestic legal order have been put into effect
through the ordinary legislative channels.47
Notwithstanding the drawbacks and defects highlighted in the preceding section, the
infringement procedure does remain a valuable weapon in the supranational armoury. If
it had never been put into place, the compliance record of the Member States would have
displayed a very grim picture indeed, and the habit of obedience with regard to EU law
would no doubt have been extremely poor nowadays. All the same, the fact that new routes
and strategies for enhancing Member State compliance have been developed over the
years underscores that, apparently, a need has been felt for drawing up alternatives to top-
down enforcement. Furthermore, a tandem approach is perfectly sensible, whereby coun-
tries are cornered in from more than one side; exclusive reliance on the central means
would surely prove inadequate, yet this anything but means that the approach ought to
be abandoned altogether. Indeed, Member States may well be neatly sandwiched by de-
ploying all the available infranational and supranational tools. Curiously, several options
would so far appear to have been either consistently overlooked or grossly underapprecia -
ted. However, as will be illustrated below, most of these can go hand-in-hand with the
instruments that are already being utilised.
At this point, it deserves mentioning that the total number of infringement actions has
been decreasing over the past few years.48 It is difficult to assert with any degree of certainty
whether the statistics reflect a growing level of compliance in the EU, or merely an inability
for the Commission to keep up with the repeated enlargements and related strain on its
resources. A corrolary of the growing membership might also be an increased politiciza-
tion of the infringement procedure, whereby the Commission’s discretion is exercised with
ever greater pragmatism, which has additionnaly brought down the number of initiated
actions. It may also be still too early to posit that the new fast-track scheme is paying off
in this regard. The cautious trends do indicate clearly though that the efforts taken so far
are in any case not enough, since violations of EU law continue to be committed. Hence,
the need for pursuing them has certainly not disappeared altogether, nor has the interest
in devising alternative means for countering them.
3.2 Improving the Quality of EU Legislation
It is no secret that the complex, convoluted, often outright byzantine character often
causes the work of national civil servants tasked with implementing and enforcing EU law
ADVANCING THE SUPRANATIONAL COMPLIANCE DEBATE...                                        1–22
13TLQ  1/2014   | www.ilaw.cas.cz/tlq
46 Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy, [1991] ECR I-5375.
47 See e.g. Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending
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to be extremely burdensome. The time and effort necessary to plumb the depths of a new
piece of European legislation has led to a classic bottleneck problem, with too many rules
needing to be fathomed, within timeframes that almost always prove too stringent, making
delays, mistakes, or both almost inevitable. The remedy seems simple: improve the quality
of EU legislation, and the problems evaporate like snow in summer. In itself, this solution
is as clear as day. Yet, it calls for an in-depth reflection from several different angles.
In the past decades, various plans and schemes have already been concocted to im-
prove legislative drafting. The 1992 Sutherland Report proposed that every new legislative
initiative be scrutinised on the basis of five criteria, namely 1) the need for action 2) the
choice of the most effective course of action 3) the proportionality of the measure 4) the
consistency with existing measures 5) wider consultation of the circles concerned during
the preparatory stages.49 The Edinburgh European Council taking place that same year
emphasised the importance of ensuring that new laws would be transparent and intelli-
gible.50 1993 saw the Council adopting a resolution on the quality of drafting legislation.51
In 1994, the Council, Commission and Parliament concluded an inter-institutional agree-
ment on the codification of legislative texts, and shortly thereafter, an independent expert
group published a follow-up paper to the Sutherland proposals.52 From 1995 onwards, the
Commission started to issue regular reports on ‘Better Lawmaking’, and advanced a num-
ber of pilot projects.53
It was only in 1998 that the Council, Commission and Parliament managed to reach
agreement on a set of comprehensive guidelines, specifying that new acts should be clear
and precise, that the drafting should be appropriate to the type of measure concerned,
that the persons to whom the act is addressed should be taken into account, that provi-
sions need to be concise and their content homogeneous, and that the translation impli-
cations of the chosen structure has to be taken into account. More detailed pointers were,
inter alia, that the terminology employed is expected to be consistent, in the act itself and
vis-à-vis the entire body of EU law, that the titles give a full indication of the subject matter,
that internal and external references are kept to a minimum, and repeals are expressly in-
troduced.54 Additionally, for several years now, the Commission has embarked on a quest
to codify, recast and consolidate the existing legal texts, and it recently announced its in-
tention to engage in ‘Smart Regulation’, whereby increased importance would be attached
to assessing the impact of proposed new rules at both the European and the national level,
and the voice of citizens and stakeholders is to be strengthened.55
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As will be understood from this rough overview, the issue has been on the agenda for
quite some time now, and there has been no dearth of ideas on how it ought to be tackled.
All the same, the schemes and proposals appear to be repeating the same familiar points
over and over again, while in reality, many legal instruments continue to cause difficulties
at the implementation or enforcement stage, due to fuzzy wording, a puzzling structure,
incidental impreciseness or structural ambiguity. A familiar response is that these short-
comings are far from accidental, but the direct outcome of a policy-making process in
which the actors deliberately choose to insert equivocal terms. On many dossiers, hard-
wrought compromises need to be reached, while each party involved will try hard to see
its own point of view prevail. Even if one needs to give in to some extent, as long as the
final text turns out to be ambiguous enough, decision-makers will have been able to se-
cure sufficient flexibility for the protection of their own non-negotiable policy prefer-
ences. In short, EU law is a droit diplomatique, and in this unusually sensitive arena,
quality concerns are inevitably secondary.56 While this insight has obtained a classic sta-
tus, it simultaneously possesses a mythical dimension. To begin with, as regards those
measures that are adopted through procedures that involve only a small number of in-
stitutions or bodies, the struggles to find common ground are hardly as fierce.57 Also,
while it runs entirely counter to the popular idea, of some EU legislation, the clarity is in
fact patently greater than that of similar national rules; this e.g. holds true for the sophis-
ticated definitions of key concepts in European environmental rules.58 Furthermore, the
idea that supranational rules are often deliberately vague so as to ensure that Member
States are better able to align them with their domestic preferences could certainly hold
true for directives; there is however an abundance of EU legislation that does not require
additional national action, and those texts ultimately cannot remain so open-ended,
since that would empty them of their basic utility – rendering useless the whole draft-
ing-and-adopting exercise.
The immanency of the problem is, in other words, overstated, making it definitely
worthwhile to explore how quality improvements can be realised. As far as possible, legal
texts should be accessible and unambiguous, especially in light of the fact that they are to
be translated into different languages. Clarity includes the use of plain language, a mini-
mum of jargon and avoidance of excessively long sentences; unambiguity a sufficient level
of detail, and consistent use of the same phraseology. Ascertainable variations between
Member States need to be kept well in mind, and in the same light, the scope of rules
needs to be made as explicit as possible, as well as the relation to other instruments. Al-
ternative forms of regulation are to be encouraged, and abstention from rule-making to
be preferred in domains that cannot claim special priority (for example, tourism, sports,
education, and outer space). 
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For sure, these precepts are straightforward enough, but they require constant moni-
toring. Thus, the present institutional architecture might call for an extra check or special
oversight body at the final stages of the regulatory trajectory at supranational level. The
practice of preliminary impact assessments indeed requires to be intensified, for with each
new proposal, it must first be beyond doubt that legislation is the essential and most suit-
able means to achieve the stated objective.59 In view of the impressive stockpile that has
recently amassed, there is surely no need for any novel guidelines, but the composition
and liberal distribution of a succinct précis could be very welcome. By the same token, al-
though many drafters have accumulated a vast expertise and are frequently able to
demonstrate they possess the skills required, they might well benefit from extra training
to sharpen their focus.
While the quality problem is not totally insurmountable, EU legislation is of course un-
likely to ever reach perfection; the traditional difference of opinion in every democratic
polity, and the natural impossibility of language to convey meaning without uncertainties
will see to that. Poorly drafted European rules however risk giving rise to under- or overreg-
ulation, vague, conflicting or inaccurate provisions within twenty-eight national legal orders,
damaging the credibility of the EU and wounding public support for further integration.60
Holding Member States to account for non-compliance, even when at least part of the re-
sponsibility for the default may lie with the Union legislature, sparks off a vicious feedback-
loop. Every effort should be taken to avoid such endless shifting-the-blame-games.
3.3 Additional Guidance through Soft Law
Even when the quality of the supranational rules to be applied in the domestic systems
is up to scratch, it might still be excruciatingly hard to determine where and how to fit
them into the domestic system so that they come out best. Soft law instruments, especially
when specifically geared towards the regulatory styles of particular Member States, offer
one way to alleviate such hardships.61 Of course if, conversely, the supranational rules at
stake lack the quality for national civil servants to understand how to proceed, such in-
struments are just as welcome. Since soft law is generally not subject to any conspicuous
legislative procedure, it may be comparatively easier to outfit them with useful pointers
concerning the scope and purpose of the ‘hard law’ measures in the field concerned, and
in so doing, supply some incomparably direct answers to controversial questions.
At face value, this suggestion appears anything but ground-breaking, since the EU al-
ready subscribes to this strategy. Indeed, a growing tendency to resort to soft law can be
witnessed that has reinforced its prominence as a topic of academic debate and reflec-
tion.62 In the previous section, reference was made to communications, guidelines and
HENRI DE WAELE                                                                                                          1–22
16 www.ilaw.cas.cz/tlq   | TLQ  1/2014
59 By the same token, the European Court of Auditors has pointed out that the interests protected in the so-called
‘policy-linking clauses’ could be more evenly balanced; see European Court of Auditors. Impact Assessments in
the EU Institutions: Do they Support Decision-Making? Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union
2010.
60 XANTHAKI, H. The Problem of Quality in EU Legislation: What on Earth is Really Wrong? Common Market Law
Review. 2001, No. 38, p. 652.
61 Cf. VAN WAARDEN, F. European Harmonization of National Regulatory Styles? In: John Vervaele et al. (eds.). Com-
pliance and Enforcement of European Community Law. Deventer: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 95–124.
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inter-institutional agreements; among the many other manifestations that have emerged
are notices, declarations, resolutions, recommendations, and action plans. The common
denominator is that they officially all lack binding effect; nevertheless, soft law has been
found to frame institutional expectations and open actors to diverse forms of peer pres-
sure.63 Consequently, it has been criticised for permitting the normal systems of account-
ability to be bypassed, for circumventing the limits to the competence to issue hard law
and eroding the Union’s overall legitimacy. It is debatable though whether the benefits do
not carry greater weight, notably, that hard law fosters and promotes uniformity, while
deviations at national level may require a tailor-made approach, and that hard law pro-
ceeds on the basis of a fixed situation, whereas changing conditions may call for contin-
uous refining and adjusting.64
If a greater reliance on soft law means may indeed enhance compliance, this does not mean
the strategy should be allowed to spin out of control. In any case, the nature of the policy field
ought to determine its viability, and it only deserves special consideration in those areas where
there are good indications that Member States could profit from extra guidance. Additionally,
as remarked, it is wise to conduct a meticulous inquiry in order to establish the precise ne-
cessities of actors and stakeholders in the national context before proceeding to draw up the
package, since it has been asserted that soft law most frequently tends to be complied with
when the norms concerned are in line with their vested interests.65 Finally, it is worthwhile to
ruminate more extensively on the possibility of a tailor-made, instead of a ‘one size fits all’ ap-
proach, i.e. issuing detailed rules for selected (groups of) EU countries. This option appears
all the more credible precisely because the rules are soft, and thus flexible.66
3.4 Increased Private Enforcement
Over the past years, both the Commission and the Court have come out as avid sup-
porters of private enforcement of EU norms, particularly with regard to the rules of com-
petition law.67 As referred above, this approach has been strongly facilitated by the ECJ’s
revolutionary decision to launch the ‘direct effect’ remedy in the 1960s, handing private
citizens a powerful means to effectuate their rights in a ‘vertical fashion’ (i.e. against public
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authorities). At the same time however, by turning to national courts with their demands
that national authorities take their European obligations seriously, knowingly or unknow-
ingly, they act rather neatly in the broader interest of the EU institutions. In the early 1990s,
seeking to enhance compliance further, the ECJ opened up the possibility for financial
claims against Member States in case of gross and harmful deficiencies, progressively
moving on in recent times to galvanise the possibilities for ‘horizontal’ litigation (actions
by private parties against other individuals for not complying with EU rules).68
To be sure, in order to increase private enforcement, the awareness of the available
remedies among potential litigants would need to be raised. For starters, this calls for
intense, wide-ranging but consciously targeted information campaigns, possibly cou-
pled with accessible schemes for financing the necessary legal aid. Moreover, much
depends on the aptitude, prowess and vigilance of national judges. Presently, the ju-
diciaries of the Member States are already very actively enhancing their knowledge
base with regard to European law. The year 2000 witnessed the launch of a new gen-
eral platform, the ‘European Judicial Training Network’, which deserves unconditional
support for broadening and expanding its activities, especially in the newly acceded
countries.69 In the past, the EU stimulated and subsidised the setting up of specialised
programmes, and if the resources are available, such concentrated schemes could be
reinstated as well.
At this point though, confronted with the prospect of incrementally multiplying court
actions, a slight hesitancy might creep up. For indeed, if all those negatively affected by
non-compliance were to take matters into their own hands more quickly, compliance is
likely to increase and, consequently, top-down enforcement becomes less necessary. Yet,
it would reinforce a ‘litigation culture’ and promote an already growing judicialisation of
society. In light of the experiences in the United States, this may well incite ever greater
public distrust and more wide-spread discontent.70 Also, any extra stimulus on private en-
forcement is bound to result in higher administrative and logistic burdens for the judiciary,
calling for extra expenditure which, in times of crisis, probably not all Member States are
able to afford. 
These doubts notwithstanding, from a formal perspective, the EU is perfectly entitled
to proceed further along this road. Hereby, one final thing that should be kept in mind is
that it has so far been willing to condone a basic heterogeneity with regard to Member
States’ domestic procedural law, thus allowing for centrifugal tendencies to simmer on.71
In contrast, the objective of top-down enforcement is to ensure uniformity in the appli-
cation of EU law, thus strengthening the centripetal forces. In the long run, this asymmet-
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ric pattern might prove untenable, necessitating a full-swing harmonisation of national
judicial remedies.
3.5 Other Tools and Incentives at the Supranational Level
Apart from the probing, intrinsically assertive infringement procedure, other institu-
tionalised but less intrusive responses are thinkable to ‘tickle’ Member States that have
gone astray back in line. These are thought to chime nicely with our earlier argument that
positive tactics, ‘carrot’ or ‘velvet gloves’ tactics might be more conducive to a good result
than sticks or iron fists. 
Firstly, in combination with improved quality controls and the more expansive use
of soft law advocated above, the Commission can facilitate the reception of EU rules
by more intensively reviewing whether they are totally fit for purpose. In 2010, the
Commission already decided to undertake such ‘fitness checks’ in four areas, and ul-
timately, it ought to be rolled out to all other policy areas.72 This endeavour received
a further impetus with the ‘REFIT’ initiative in 2013, which set out concrete areas
where it means to take concrete action in order to evaluate, revise, simplify
and/or withdraw European laws.73 The Commission undertakes other sorts of ‘pre-
ventive action’, performing impact assessments and offering assistance to Member
States during implementation to anticipate problems (e.g. in the form of transposi-
tion workshops), but it is suggested here that a more comprehensive effort could be
thought out. As the time-limits for the transposition of directives frequently turn out
to be too optimistic, this effort should include a further inquiry on this topic, in an
attempt to uncover the optimal criteria for determining the deadline.74 Secondly, if
(hard or soft) follow-up rules are essential for national public authorities to proceed
with implementing the legislation at stake, the EU institutions must stick to a rigid
time-schedule in issuing and/or communicating these as well, with every care being
taken that the quality of those rules does not suffer as a result.75 Lastly, new commu-
nication initiatives and targeted information campaigns may stimulate a more spon-
taneous observance of the rules in force. This too should help to stave off a second
feedback loop, wherein the Member States are once again held responsible for de-
faults and deficiencies as a matter of principle, whereas with due diligence and
slightly more focus, the EU institutions could just as well have prevented the incrim-
inated practices from occurring.
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72 See Communication from the Commission, supra n. 55, p. 5.
73 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT): Results and
Next Steps, COM(2013) 685 final.
74 Cf. HAVERLAND, M., STEUNENBERG, B., VAN WAARDEN, F. Sectors at Different Speeds: Analysing Transposition
Deficits in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies. 2011, No. 49, p. 286.
75 Take e.g. Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination
of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities, O.J. [2009] L 302/32, which could not be fully transposed without the implementing directives adopted
in July 2010, or Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the geo-
logical storage of carbon dioxide, O.J. [2009] L 140/114, the proper transposition of which required specific Com-
mission guidelines that were adopted as late as March 2011.
3.6 Other Tools and Incentives at the National Level
In 1998, the Commission emphasised that the Member States had an own role to play in
the process of improving the quality of legislation.76 There are a number of other changes and
innovations they could decide to introduce of their own motion, the background idea being
that monitoring and control of compliance is indeed a shared responsibility of the competent
European and national authorities.77 As we have seen, the Union has adopted several plans
to enhance the content and accessibility of EU law. A High Level Group of Better Regulation
Experts, in which Commission and national officials confer and exchange views and best
practices, is also up and running. Yet, only a few countries have put in place a system of better
regulation that is as wide-ranging as that of the Commission.78 Pursuant to their legal duty of
active and sincere cooperation, it is not too far-fetched to ask Member States to undertake
supplementary action and proceed to launch a dedicated programme as well. 
A comparable national initiative, recently drawn up in the Netherlands, might also be
usefully introduced in other parts of the EU. Translated into English, the Dutch abbrevia-
tion ‘NErpe’ stands for ‘compliance with European rules by public entities’ (Naleving Eu-
ropese regels door publieke entiteiten). This regulatory framework, which was adopted in
June 2012, should be read to the background of the rather dire Dutch compliance record,
which can at least partly be attributed to weak coordination between the responsible pub-
lic authorities.79 The Services Directive provided a related stimulus for its development,
particularly due to its high complexity, and the likelihood of multiple legal challenges and
problems.80 The objective of the NErpe is to strengthen the hold of the central authorities
in The Hague over all other public sector actors that are involved, at any stage, in the im-
plementation trajectory of European rules. In case of deficiencies, whether deliberate or
inadvertent, it provides for a capacious tool-box that enables a swift (though fairly author-
itarian) form of resolution. The general practise will be that a cabinet minister, sometimes
after conferral with one of this equals at a different department, issues a binding instruc-
tion to the public entity concerned when it does not live up to its EU law obligations, or
when it does so untimely. The entity concerned may explain itself and give its views on
the matter, but if it fails to convince and the instruction is still not complied with within
the time-limit specified, the required remedy shall be put in place immediately on the
order of the central government.81 On the one hand, this ‘power grab’ ought to ensure
a short-circuiting of the previous (lengthy) foot-dragging exercises and tiresome coordi-
nation conflicts. On the other, the severe impact of direct intervention, subordinating the
entity concerned to a higher command, irrespective of competences specifically attributed
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76 See Commission Report to the European Council – Better Lawmaking 1998: A Shared Responsibility, COM(1998)
715 final.
77 A succesful initative, shouldered by both, that cannot go unmentioned is the creation of the so-called ‘SOLVIT
centres’ in all Member States, which aim to provide direct solution to legal problems of citizens through a direct
contacting and counseling of the competent domestic authorities.
78 For a survey of the legislative drafting rules in various Member States, see XANTHAKI, H. supra n. 61, pp. 660–666.
79 On which see e.g. MASTENBROEK, E. The Politics of Compliance. Explaining the Transposition of EC Directives
in The Netherlands. Wageningen: Ponsen & Looijen 2007.
80 For further discussion, see e.g. WAELE, H. The Transposition and Enforcement of the Services Directive: A Chal-
lenge for the European and the National Legal Orders. European Public Law. 2009, No. 15, pp. 523–531.
81 Thus Articles 2 and 5 of the NErpe (the full Dutch text can be consulted on <https://zoek.officielebekendmakin-
gen.nl/kst-32157-3.html>, last visited 10 December 2013).
to it, entails that it should be employed with extreme caution.82 The NErpe also rules out
interference with court practise and correction of errors of judges, which appears wholly
sensible in light of the vested separation of powers concept.
In line with the principle of sincere cooperation, all Member States are to make sure
that they possess the means to guarantee a situation of optimal compliance. The Nether-
lands already possesses a generic legal framework for supervision and control in inter alia
the municipal and provincial law (the ‘Gemeentewet’ and the ‘Provinciewet’), but the
NErpe offers an ultimate and extremely powerful means, which could be emulated by
other Member States. Belgium and Germany already have similar systems in place. In
France however, the competences of decentralised authorities have expanded greatly
since the 1980s, yet they are merely obliged to inform the central government of important
decisions, and there exist only specialised and fairly weak control mechanisms in case of
omissions or gross negligence.83 The same goes mutatis mutandis for Spain, and for the
United Kingdom in the post-devolution area. If they were indeed to align themselves vol-
untarily with the new Dutch scheme, at least in those countries, compliance with Euro-
pean norms might be ensured with greater vigour, and consequently, there may be much
less need for top-down enforcement.  
4. IN CONCLUSION: THE ROAD AHEAD
While the defects of the infringement procedure, outlined in this paper, are certainly
not crippling, it is questionable whether they can be remedied in a way that makes it un-
necessary to look for alternatives. The attribution of similar monitoring and sanctioning
powers to other bodies and agencies would be prone to suffer from the same defects,
strengthening the case for more positive tactics and bottom-up initiatives. In the preced-
ing paragraphs, we have engaged in a (non-exhaustive) survey of several such alternatives
which seem not to have received sufficient consideration yet. Their benefits may be un-
derestimated or seen as not to outweigh the potential costs. In fact however, not that many
changes would have to be made to the Union’s current legal architecture to put them in
practice. At the EU level, improved quality controls for legislation can be installed rather
swiftly, and the dominant approach to soft law may be tweaked in the suggested direction
without much effort. The compiling of a comprehensive package to facilitate the reception
of European law in the national legal order could take more time, but there are no fore-
seeable legal impediments. The promotion of private enforcement in the Member States
is rather more tricky, for even if every potential litigant could be mobilised, judiciaries
could eventually be swamped with cases, while judgments underscoring the errors, omis-
sions or wholesale default of a Member State do not provide an automatic cure for the
non-compliance (which may be persistent and difficult to bring to an end).84 Moreover,
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82 As might be expected, similar critiques were voiced in The Netherlands in the run-up to the law’s adoption.
83 See e.g. VERHOEVEN, M. The Costanzo Obligation and the Principle of National Institutional Autonomy: 
Supervision as a Bridge to Close the Gap? Review of European Administrative Law. 2010, No. 3, pp. 42–47.
84 In the same vein, in some countries courts consider themselves incompetent to instruct the legislature with re-
gard to the actions that need to be taken; see e.g. the Dutch Waterpakt case, discussed by Leonard Besselink.
Common Market Law Review. 2004, No. 41, pp. 1429–1455.
in so doing, the EU would be contributing to an increased and undesirable judicialisation
of society85.
A greater awareness of the viability of the alternatives to top-down enforcement is
a key priority anyhow. A special ‘compliance taskforce’ could be entrusted with their
operationalisation, and all actions taken would naturally need to be periodically re-
viewed and adjusted. Even in the long run, this is unlikely to lead to full compliance,
as it is impossible to obtain total control over every determinative factor. Also, legisla-
tion will always retain a certain ambiguity, public authorities will continue to make
mistakes, and the deeply-rooted constitutional structure of Member States will remain
a regular cause for delay. There are nonetheless still opportunities abound to advance
the potential for correctly applying European rules and principles. The EU cannot af-
ford to neglect these if its objective is seriously to realize a genuine Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice; and in due time, to embrace the true meaning of that attractive,
but perhaps all too boldly proclaimed notion.
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